Collective goals? REGULATORY CAPTURE!
June 2nd, 2021
Here we go again. It’s bad enough that CapX 2020 is morphing into CapX 2050/Grid North Partners, but they’re having a “conference” (sign up here) in a couple weeks.
Look at the Chair of this panel, none other than the Chair of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission, and the description:
… TO MEET OUR COLLECTIVE GOALS?
Remember the toadying for CapX 2020? Remember the toadying for Excelsior Energy’s Mesaba Project coal gasification? Remember the toadying for Prairie Island/NSP/Xcel Energy’s nuclear plants, particularly Prairie Island circa 1994 and 2003?
This sort of thing has been an issue before, and former Chair LeRoy Koppendrayer has been the only one to acknowledge this type of participation as an issue — this was in 2007:
IEDC gets carried away
When this happens, I contact the PUC and register concerns, and have always been assured that they know well the boundaries.
And, well, here’s Commissioner Tuma on DOE Nuclear Waste panel circa 2016:
DOE “Consent-Based” Nuclear Waste Mtg.
This was also an issue with Commissioner Reha when she went off on a coal gasification junket to Belgium and promotion of CapX 2020! See the John Tuma link, above, for this with active links:
When the promotion and bias is so blatant, I’m not about to watch silently. Earth to PUC Commissioners, here are the PUC’s rules:
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/rules/7845.0400/
https://www.revisor.mn.gov/rules/7845.0700/
And when you see something, say something?
Ummmm, right…
ALJ “INVESTIGATIVE REPORT PURSUANT TO MINN. STAT. § 216A.037”
Listen to Commissioner Tuma’s words that were the subject of our complaint at the link above. And the ALJ’s report delivers this warning:
I guess it will be an informal complaint, eh?
Where were you the night of June 25, 1998?
January 13th, 2020
The June 25, 1998 blackout report needs to be on the interwebs available to the world.
June 25, 1998? That’s the night of the transmission fail that disconnected the Midwest from the Eastern Interconnect. That question was asked by Minnesota Power’s attorney of each and every witness, I think other than MP, but maybe MP witnesses too, in the Arrowhead transmission project hearing, circa 1999-2000. There were cries of “Hospitals will go dark without the Arrowhead project,” “We’re going to freeze in the dark in an incubator” which became “We’re going to freeze in the dark on a respirator without a job” — it was so histrionic.
The Arrowhead transmission project was project 13J of the WRAO Report, and the WIREs Report, which presented many transmission lines, but chose the Arrowhead transmission project as the “be all and end all” of transmission in the Midwest, that it would fix all the transmission problems:
The hearing went forward, 2 weeks in Minnesota, where MP got an exemption from Minnesota Power Plant siting law, and for TWO MONTHS in Wisconsin, for Round 1, then 2 weeks after the cost went way up, and another 3-5 days of hearing later when cost went up again. They got their permit, it’s up…
But in that first hearing, I did get to introduce the report that showed that the June 25, 1998, blackout was NOT caused by too little capacity, it was not caused by an unreliable transmission system. It was caused by corporate greed, transmission operators running the Prairie Island-Byron 345kV’s TCEX flow over the limit, disregarding operating guides, and disregarding requests and demands to ramp the power down, violating MAPP Operating Standards and NERC Operating Policies. SHAME, NSP, SHAME!!! And MP was so tacky, trying to attribute their desire for bulk power transfer to the blackout, that the Arrowhead project would save us. Yeah, right…
Here’s the report, below, it’s a gem, I’m posting this today because I’m shoveling off my desk and there are a lot of gems here, so posting them will get them out into the world in perpetuity — can’t disappear something from the internet! Scanning them in is taking a while, a royal and dusty pain in the patoot, but just for you inquiring minds, HERE IT IS:
Here are a couple snippets, starting with p. 2:
Bottom line?
OPERATE WITHIN OPERATING GUIDE LIMITS!!
DOH!
The report goes on and on with stupid human tricks – the flow was NOT reduced by NSP System Operators:
From pps 10-11:
So if the operators had been doing the job, not focused on keeping that line operating with all that power flowing through it, selling that power, the blackout may not have happened. Great…
And for some reason, NSP operators were not communicating:
300 MW above the operating guide limits:
OPERATE WITHIN OPERATING GUIDE LIMITS!! DOH!
Operator error is a too-generous way to put it — but for the efforts to NOT reduce power flows, the inadequate response of system operators and their failure to communicate the degree of the problem, the blackout may not have happened. And then utilities have the nerve to say that because of the June 25, 1998 blackout, we need the 13j Arrowhead transmission project?
Xcel wants to sell coal on market… DOH!
January 10th, 2020
How many years have I been saying that the purpose of this massive transmission build-out is to market coal elsewhere? Decades, folks, it’s been decades… And this latest from Xcel Energy, Notice of Comment period just out today, is demonstration that they plan to keep running those coal plants and selling it. Will the Public Utilities Commission care?
Here’s the newly released Xcel Energy plan, and a comment period:
The plan?
Here’s the Notice:
What to comment about? From the Commission’s Notice:
Bulk power transfer was the whole point of the transmission build-out, to be able to sell anything generated at any Point A to any Point B. And then coal generated here could be sold elsewhere, eastward via transmission, while we use generation that isn’t quite so dirty (but that’s dirty in its own way). We’re so clean here in Minnesota… NOT! We’ve been a pass through for Dakotas’ coal for a while, and now, they’re asking permission to keep burning coal here and send that energy eastward.
They built all that transmission, no Commission I’ve seen has ever found a transmission plan they didn’t like and roll over for, and now we’re paying for it. Rate increases anyone? Are you paying attention to what’s pushing those rates up?
Why ever would I say that it’s all about selling coal? Well… there’s a bit of a pattern going here. There was the Chisago project, starting in 1996 and three iterations in Minnesota and Wisconsin, not to mention the WRAO report:
WRAO laid out many transmission lines and the Arrowhead transmission project, circa 1999, was selected as the be all and end all of transmission after many hearings were held, one hearing in Minnesota and THREE before Wisconsin PSC, the price kept going UP, UP, UP!
But then on September 8, 2001, a meeting with likely intervenors to see if they could be convinced to “approve” of the SW Minnesota 345kV line, remember that, Commissioner Matt Schuerger? I pointed out all that coal lined up in the SW MN 345kV study… and from there on to the SW MN 345kV line, part of ABB plan for coal:
Don’t ya just love that name? It says it all. Why the ABB Lignite Vision 21 Transmission Study? The opening paragraph, linked above, DOH! says:
The SW MN 345kV line was the part that’s running east to west on the lower part of that yellow map, from Split Rock sub to Lakefield Junction. Some claimed it was an “It’s for WIND!” line, but that’s a lie, just read that ABB study again. The powerflows showed that it wasn’t to carry energy off of Buffalo Ridge, there was just 213-302 MVA coming off Buffalo Ridge into the over 2,000 MVA capacity line:
How stupid do they think we are? Well, money talked, and that money ruled the day. That SW MN 345kV line and the TRANSLink Settlement Agreement and 2005 Transmission Omnibus Bill from Hell (and changes to Minn. Stat. 117.189) laid the groundwork to bring us $2+ BILLION of CapX 2020:
And then the MISO MVP 17 project portfolio, now over $6 BILLION:
And then they have the audacity to suggest we need MORE transmission?
Upper Midwest utilities to study transmission grid in light of ambitious carbon reduction goals
So please explain how selling coal generated electricity on the MISO market is consistent with carbon reduction goals?
What a crock…
U of M Humphrey “report” on CapX 2020
April 28th, 2016
It’s out, the report from U of M Humphrey School of Public Affairs about CapX 2020, headlining it as a “Model for addressing climate change.“
Transmission Planning and CapX 2020: Building Trust to Build Regional Transmission Systems
Oh, please, this is all about coal, and you know it. This is all about enabling marketing of electricity. In fact, Xcel’s Tim Carlsbad testified most honestly that CapX 2020 was not for wind! That’s because electrical energy isn’t ID’d by generation source, as Jimbo Alders also testified, and under FERC, discrimination in generation sources is not allowed, transmission must serve whatever is there. And the report early on, p. 4, notes:
Both North and South Dakota have strong wind resources and North Dakota also has low-BTU lignite
coal resources that it wants to continue to use. New high-voltage transmission lines are needed to
support the Dakotas’ ability to export electricity to neighboring states.See also: ICF-Independent Assessment MISO Benefits
Anyway, here it is, and it’s much like Phyllis Reha’s puff piece promoting CapX 2020 years ago while she was on the Public Utilities Commission, that this is the model other states should use:
MN PUC Commissioner Reha’s Feb 15 2006 presentation promoting CapX 2020
So put on your waders and reading glasses and have at it.
Here’s the word on the 2005 Transmission Omnibus Bill from Hell – Chapter 97 – Revisor of Statutes that gave Xcel and Co. just what they wanted, transmission as a revenue stream:
And note how opposition is addressed, countered by an organization that received how much to promote transmission. This is SO condescending:
… and opposition discounted because it’s so technical, what with load flow studies, energy consumption trends, how could we possibly understand? We couldn’t possibly understand… nevermind that the decreased demand we warned of, and which demonstrated lack of need, was the reality that we were entering in 2008.
And remember Steve Rakow’s chart of demand, entered at the very end of the Certificate of Need hearing when demand was at issue??? In addition to NO identification of axis values, the trend he promoted, and which was adopted by the ALJ and Commission, has NOT happened, and instead Xcel is adjusting to the “new normal” and whining that the grid is only 55% utilized in its e21 and rate case filings. Here’s Steve Rakow’s chart:
Reality peak demand trajectory was lower than Rakow’s “slow growth” line, in fact, it’s the opposite from 2007 to present. Suffice it to say: